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Introduction 
In the fall of 2005 two major hurricanes hit the Gulf Coast region resulting in 
devastating impacts, particularly for residents of New Orleans. As is well known, the 
majority of residents of New Orleans were forced to evacuate, moving to several 
alternative locations across the U.S. At the time we write this (early in 2007), most of the 
people who evacuated have still not moved back to New Orleans. 
In this manuscript we report on findings from a quasi-field experiment of a small 
group of subjects displaced by the 2005 hurricanes, Katrina and Rita.1 The sampled 
group, though small, is remarkable in that they all were deeply and personally affected by 
the hurricanes. All of the people in our sample evacuated from their homes and were still 
away months after the hurricane. The homes of a majority of the sample were severely 
damaged and almost a third of the sample lost a family member in the hurricane. Our 
research evaluates the risk perceptions and explains stated intentions to move back to the 
area they left during the hurricanes, as well as location choices presented to each subject 
in a stated choice experiment. 
We will report here on three issues related to risk perceptions and preferences of 
the sampled evacuees. First, we consider the question of their perceptions of hurricane 
risk. In a short survey that subjects take, we ask each respondent his or her perceptions of 
risk. The first time the subject is asked, no information is presented, and on subsequent 
questions information is given. As more information is provided, respondents may update 
their prior assessment of risks that they brought with them to the interview. We regress 
their stated probabilities on characteristics and experiences the subjects had during the 
hurricane to evaluate how perceptions of risk are affected by the impacts. Of particular 
interest, consistent with a model of ambiguity aversion, we find that uncertainty about the 
true probability leads the group to increase their “best guess” as to the probability of a 
hurricane. The results of this model are then used in a test of whether risk perceptions 
affect an individual’s interest in moving back to the Gulf coast. 
We also report the results of a model that explains stated intention to move back 
to the area they left, which is analyzed as a function of the subjects’ subjective risks and 
other relevant individual specific variables.  Second, we report results of a choice 
experiment in which we can evaluate the trade-offs between given levels of risks and 
income presented to the subject, controlling for amenities and other characteristics of the 
location. We find that risks, though calculated differently in each of these models, play a 
significant role.  This abstract presents the conceptual foundations of our chosen 
explanatory models, and discusses previous literature regarding stated choice modeling 
and subjective risk perceptions pertinent to this study.  No empirical results are reported 
as a second round of data collection is currently being conducted.   
Background Literature on Risk Perceptions and Choice Modeling 
It is widely recognized in other disciplines such as psychology (eg., Slovic 1987), 
now often spreading over into economics, that if we wish to explain behavior or stated 
preferences, appealing to subjective risk assessments likely works better than reliance on 
so-called expert risk assessments. However, the problems that arise for economists when 
subjective risk estimates are used are potentially numerous and can not be fully 
enumerated here. Among these are key issues related to the incorporation of subjective 
risks into a decision framework commonly used by economists (see Shaw, Jakus and 
Riddel 2005 for discussion of some of these), such that theoretical axioms of preference 
are not violated. Most often the formal modeling framework is the expected utility model 
(EUM); use of the subjective risks in such a framework may be deemed the subjective 
EUM (SEUM). 
The EU framework has guided most analysis of decisions in situations of risks 
with known probabilities and the SEUM of Savage (1954) can handle some situations 
where probabilities are unknown. These models have been successful not only because of 
their compelling axiomatic foundations and ability to describe economic choices, but also 
for the purely practical reason that their mathematical structure facilitates both theoretical 
and empirical analysis. 
A problem may arise when subjective risk estimates of the public are hugely 
different from the expert (science community) assessment. For example, in the work on 
nuclear/radioactive waste risks, the experts deem mortality risks to be on the order of 2 in 
10 million, while a sample of subjects thought these to be thousands of times higher (see 
Riddel and Shaw 2006). To make matters still worse, some people simply cannot reduce 
the uncertainty about the risks they face in order to reveal a unique probability 
distribution. This situation, often referred to as ambiguity, frequently leads to behavior 
that is inconsistent with either the EUM or SEUM (e.g., Ellsberg 1961). In other 
instances where people make decisions they do so as if they place nonlinear weights on 
the probabilities. A classic outcome is their overweighting of very low probabilities and 
underweighting much more likely events (e.g., Allais 1953; Prelec 1999; Gonzalez and 
Wu 1999). When there are large differences between personal and expert probabilities or 
when ambiguity is pervasive the axioms consistent with the EU and SEU frameworks are 
frequently violated. Though we do not formally test these axioms here, as will be seen 
below, we ask questions of the subjects that help us discern whether they remain 
ambiguous about hurricane risks, even when they are given information which might 
conflict with their prior assessment of such risks. 
The Models 
In this section we describe two simple models applied in this study. In the first, 
we simply estimate a model of the subject’s stated risk of a hurricane striking New 
Orleans. The second is a stated choice model that includes attributes of labeled locations. 
Note that results based on a standard discrete choice (probit) model of stated intentions to 
move back to their area of origin are also included below, but all readers are assumed 
familiar with this procedure, so it is not discussed in any detail here. Together these 
models will allow us to explore the risk attitude and preferences over risky prospects 
faced by hurricane victims. 
Risk Model 
To evaluate subjective risk perceptions of Hurricane Katrina evacuees, we use a 
latent risk model as formulated by several psychologists and economists in past work. In 
such a model the dependent variable is the individual’s stated risk and the independent 
variables are demographic characteristics and other variables that might affect an 
individual’s subjective probability. As a recent example, Riddel and Shaw (2006) 
evaluated a sample member’s perceptions of the risks of a nuclear accident and find that 
gender, insurance coverage, age, distance from the area of the highest hazard, and other 
demographic factors can influence a person’s risk assessment.  For our exploration we 
use the expected hurricane strike risk for New Orleans as the dependent variable. Since 
probabilities are bounded by zero and one, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are 
problematic so instead we use a standard truncated (tobit) regression approach with 
bounds imposed of the zero and one.  
The Stated Choice Model 
Stated choice models and the experiments accompanying them are now standard 
in much marketing, transportation, environmental economics, health economics, and 
other economics-related literature involving discrete choices (e.g. Bennett and Blamey 
2001; Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000). There are many variants, ranging from 
experiments that are essentially paired choice conjoint experiments to ranking several 
alternatives or choices, or assigning ratings using some numerical scale to indicate the 
strength of preference. As the number of choices people face is limited, the usual 
econometric approach involves use of multinomial logit or probit methods or their 
variants, depending on the type of choice experiment that was performed. The models are 
thus also classified as random utility models (RUM) because an individual’s conditional 
utility (V) after choosing alternative i is compared to her utility conditional on choice j 
(Vj). As researchers we do not observe everything that the individual does, and we are 
thus left with the usual investigator error (εi ), which generates the usual randomness in 
the model. 
Let the vector of attributes be X, income be Y, the price of the alternative be P, 
and demographic variables be vector Z. The conditional indirect utility function is 
typically specified such that net income (Y-P) is the argument in the utility function 
involving money. Note that in the individual choice model, if components of Z do not 
vary across the alternatives (such as gender), they only influence choices if they enter the 
utility function in non-linear form, or when interacted with variables that do vary across 
alternatives. 
With this formulation the choice data are assumed to flow from a decision process 
in which the individual maximizes utility (assuming no uncertainty from their 
perspective) by choosing alternative i (i≠ j)when: 
( , , ) ( , , )i i i i i j j j j jV Y P X Z V Y P X Zε ε− + > − +  
When the errors are Type I extreme value distributed, the resulting econometric 
model is the conventional conditional binomial logit (or multinomial conditional logit if 
there are more than two alternatives). There are many trade-offs between exact 
approaches in the experiment. Perhaps the key difficulty in choice experiment design is 
that the number of combinations of choices expands very quickly when attributes of the 
alternative are added. The model ideally must include all relevant attributes, or a mis-
specification issue arises, but by including too many, the choice experiment becomes 
intractable. A related issue is that the attributes must be bundled in such a way as to avoid 
correlation problems. (see discussion in Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000).  Another 
trade-off involves how many alternatives the subject must evaluate at once. On one end, 
the researcher desires presenting each subject with all possible alternatives 
simultaneously, however, it is thought that when there are many alternatives that this is 
too difficult a conceptual task for many subjects to perform (Bennett and Adamowicz, 
2001). If subjects are highly educated (e.g., college students) they might be given 
difficult mental tasks. If not, it may be better to find an easier type of experiment. A 
simpler choice alternative approach is to present each subject with a single pair of 
alternatives at a time (A and B), let them make a choice between A, B, or neither, then 
proceed to another pair of alternatives (C and D), etc. We follow this pair-wise choice 
approach. 
The choice options used in the experiment in this study asked individuals to 
indicate whether they would prefer to location A, location B, or whether “Neither of these 
choices sounds appealing.” The hypothetical locations consisted of three main 
characteristics: housing cost, monthly income, and risk of damage from a hurricane. A 
fourth attribute, which captures the host of other characteristics that define a city, was 
described to subjects by including text that said: 
“Weather, culture, dining, entertainment and recreation opportunities [that] are much like 
[either] New Orleans [Houston, or College Station.]” 
We expected that one or more of these three cities would be familiar to all of the 
subjects in a sample group. Through the choices selected over the two options provided, 
it is possible to estimate the relative weights given to these attributes. 
Summary 
The analysis in this paper is based on a small sample of people who were 
displaced by Hurricane Katrina or Rita in the fall of 2005. Though the sample size used 
in cross-sectional statistical models is somewhat small (and indeed data collection for the 
second round is presently being conducted), the analysis represents a special opportunity 
to examine victims of Katrina in detail: a great deal of data on their risk preferences was 
collected. Preliminary results indicate that displaced hurricane victims have difficulty in 
processing information about so-called “expert” hurricane risks, when interviewed just 
after hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We have also found that individuals are risk averse in 
their stated relocation choices, often choosing the location with the lower level of 
hurricane risk.  Furthermore, there is convincing evidence in our initial data assessment 
that individuals with arbitrarily high subjective risk estimates are very unlikely to chose 
locations with a risk level labeled “high,” often accepting a significant reduction in 
monthly income to reduce the likelihood of hurricane events.  Once second round data 
collection is completed formal econometric models will be fully implemented, and results 
will be presented at the UCOWR annual meeting in Boise, ID (July, 2007).   
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